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that IRBs are political rather than ethical creatures and safeguard the interests of
researchers above patients. He makes suggestions for the reorganization of IRBs to make
them more democratic.
McNeill's arguments illustrate that Snow's analysis still holds true. His position is
that IRBs, staffed mostly by medical workers, exist so that research can be approved. To
a non-scientist, the business-like nature of IRBs is disconcerting because the very deper-
sonalization ofthe review process cannot safeguard the interests ofthe individual without
special protections. McNeill ignores the fact that medical personel are people in addition
to being doctors; people for whom ethics are important. Those who do the research usu-
ally do not sit on IRBs. Moreover, as on-going enterprises, IRBs tend toward institution-
al conservatism if only to avoid debacles like that which happened in Los Angeles sever-
al years ago when a group of schizophrenics were taken off their medications so a true
placebo group could be formed for adrug trial. This conservatism is perhaps the best safe-
guard ofpatients' rights. McNeill's book, however, remains a valuable tract for exploring
the problems inherent in the shotgun marriage of ethics and medicine.
Noah Scheinfeld
Medical Student
Yale University School ofMedicine
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In Humane Medicine we are told by the publisher, "a leading surgeon examines what
doctors do, what patients expect of them and how the expectations of both are not being
met." The author's main thesis is that the aforesaid "expectations" are the product of
flawed communication between doctors and their patients and can perhaps be remedied
through improved interaction between the two groups. A secondary theme involves the
context of this difficult communication, with reference to ethics, linguistics and proba-
bilistic medical outcomes analysis.
Mies Little, clearly an admirer of Karl Popper, uses Popper's model of the scientific
method to describe the nature of the clinical process, the interaction between the patient
and doctor. This process involves an initial problem, a first trial solution, a phase oferror
elimination and a residual problem remaining after error elimination. Thus it would
appear that, by analogy, the clinical encounter is a trial-and-error process of verbal error
elimination. Little has much to say about this encounter, in particular, the necessity of
truly human doctors to confront the human problems (not only medical problems) oftheir
patients. He writes, "Clinicians who are widely read and broadly educated, who have
grappled with research as part oftheir training and with literature, philosophy, science, or
anything outside their profession which taxes their understanding and intelligence, are
likely to be able to identify and address the interconnecting problems in the interconnect-
ed worlds that their patients present (here he refers to Karl Popper's "three worlds" model
ofknowledge)." Few people in the U.S.A. would argue with this conclusion, although this
idea still runs against several decades ofadulatory preference toward the "science ofmed-
icine" in American medical education. Turning this "medical science" idea on its head,
Little argues that there is no true medical science but only a synthesis ofother disciplines
that are applied to medical problems. He points out that the statistics behind clinical trials
were developed foragriculture, notmedicine, and thatitis thesynthesis ofscientific meth-
ods toward a human goal that makes "medical science" unique, not the subject itself
The author digresses to discuss the new roles ofprobability and medical informatics,
praising the Benthamite notion of a "calculus of clinical benefit." It turns out that thisBook Reviews
digression is directly related to his thesis and leads him into adiscussion ofmedical ethics,
in particular, the problem of resolving complex issues with people who have conflicting
points of view. Despite his willingness to accept the possible benefits to medical practice
ofprobabilistic outcomes analysis, he is wary oflosing "the one-to-one relationship that
is the basis ofmedical practice." Little quotes the oncologist Emil Freireich, in this regard:
"When doctors and statisticians become ill, they ask 'Who is the best doctor for this prob-
lem?' not 'Which multi-center controlled trial would be best for me?"' It is the conflict
between epidemiological data and the n=1 that most clinicians already know well.
Little stresses that medical science is a probabilistic venture, whereas ethics and per-
sonal interaction with patients do not conform to the same model. He writes, "Inquiry in
medicine usually produces probabilities rather than certainties. Uncertainty adds to the
difficulty of ethical thinking, as it does to the processes of communication between doc-
tors and patients." Not only uncertainty but differences in philosophy can hopelessly con-
found ethical discussions, he writes. The premise ofa "calculus ofclinical benefit" is that
patients can be assigned values in mathematical equations that will decide their treatment
possibilities. In an age of scarce resources, a utilitarian ethic fits in best with cost-con-
tainment measures: to offer the best options to the most people. However, many ethicists
retain what Little calls ade-ontological view, that espoused by philosophers such as Kant,
who stressed human autonomy and the absolute duty to do what is right on an individual
basis. Little sets up a fascinating dilemma for an ethics committee, a body which he sees
as a practical but problematic solution to ethical problems in medicine. Two sets ofhypo-
thetical doctors, anesthesiologists and cardiologists, both wish to do what is right for their
patients, though due to financial constraints their actions are mutually exclusive. From a
utilitarian point ofview the cardiologists are correct in continuing to perform a procedure
with a lower incidence of overall fatality than if the anesthesiologists refuse to allow the
procedure, due to what they perceive to be an unacceptable risk to individual lives. The
question remains of how to reconcile the desire to protect individual lives with the need
to provide fair and timely treatment to the most number ofpeople.
These are some of the issues at the crux of Little's examination of "humane medi-
cine." His solution to ethical deadlock is very straightforward, although he attaches some
weighty philosophical language such as the notion of "wide reflective equilibrium" in
order to lend a touch of erudition to what seems obvious. The answer is humanistic dis-
course and resolution through compromise andgradual refinement. It is interesting thathe
does not directly relate Popper's model to this ethical process; perhaps he felt he drew
excessively on it in earlier chapters. He proposes a practical ethics based upon such ideas
as beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice and professional behavior, but in the
end seems to concede that there will always be controversy or confusion about the imple-
mentation of these principles. Whether an ethics committee or another group, such as a
political body, will dictate ethics remains an open question; on the other hand, Little is
loath to see ethics descend into the realm of immutable law, which he sees as merely an
impediment to ethicaljudgment as novel issues arise due to technological innovation.
A unifying theme in Little's book might be that science and technology has the
potential to offer great benefits to patient care, through medical informatics and the "clin-
ical calculus" for example. But without judicious human oversight and human ethics,
medical science can easily bemisdirected, with theNurnburg, Willowbrook andTuskegee
experiments serving as notable examples in this century, in addition to well-publicized
cases of medical research fraud in other countries. By more clearly defining its role in
society (to increase quality oflife, forexample, without attempting to indefinitely extend
life) and maintaining ethical oversight over medical practice, as well as educating new
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physicians in the intricacies of ethical medicine, Little offers hope that the medical pro-
fession is capable of saving itself from silent impotence in the face of increasing eco-
nomic and political pressures and influences.
Chris Janson
Medical Student
Yale University School ofMedicine
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The Neuroscience ofAnimalIntelligence provides an excellent survey ofmodern neu-
rophysiological research on learning and memory in non-human animals. By organizing
the discussion ofexperimental work within the conceptual framework of behavioral psy-
chology, the author emphasizes the interrelationships between pyschological theories of
intelligence and physiological studies ofneuronal function.
The book is divided into nine chapters. An introductory chapter outlines the histori-
cal development of intelligence research and includes a brief discussion of the "mind-
body problem." The main focus of the book is on two experimental animal models, the
mollusk Aplysia (seahare) and the mammalian hippocampus (seahorse). It progresses
from a discussion of "simple" nonassociative processes, such as habituation and sensiti-
zation, to the more complex associative processes involved in conditioning and finally to
the highly complex processes of contextual learning seen in the formation of spatial
"maps" and in memory. A concluding chapter discusses comparative neurology and com-
putational neuroscience as alternative approaches to studying animal intelligence, and a
briefepilogue analyzes some ofthe problems surrounding attempts to define intelligence.
In each subsection ofthe book the author outlines the theoretical issues and then goes
on to a critical analysis of relevant physiological experiments and their implications for
evaluating old theories and creating new ones. Emphasis is placed on the agreements
among, and contradictions between, different experiments and on the knowledge gaps that
remain to be filled. Key experiments are explained in substantial detail and are accompa-
nied by clear black-and-white illustrations.
The book is intended primarily for behavioral psychologists and neuroscientists and
therefore assumes some familiarity with basic neuroanatomy and psychology. Although
focused primarily on a few ofthe most intensively studied experimental models, the sur-
vey nonetheless presents an integrated and fairly comprehensive overview ofanimal intel-
ligence research and includes extensive references to the primary literature (through
1992). For those with an interest in behavioral neuropsychology, The Neuroscience of
Animal Intelligence provides an intriguing and informative look at the current state of
ignorance.
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